| | INCHING AWAY FROM ARMAGEDDON: DESTROYING THE U.S. |
| | 0,37 | | MB | CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE |
| | 70 | | stron |
| | 1203 | | ID | Henry L. Stimson Center |
| | 2004 | | rok |
| | INTRODUCTION |
| | On 3 September 2003, the Department of Defense issued a press release noting that the United |
| | States (US) would be unable to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadline for the |
| | destruction of 45 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile by 27 April 2004.1 This announcement |
| | also indirectly confirmed that the United States will be unable to meet the CWC’s deadline for |
| | destroying its entire stockpile by 27 April 2007. The treaty allows for a five-year extension of this |
| | final deadline, which the United States will likely need to request as that date draws closer. |
| | Chemical weapons destruction is the exception to the old adage that it is easier to destroy than to |
| | create. While some of the toxic agents are stored in bulk containers that must be emptied, their |
| | contents neutralized, and the contaminated containers destroyed, more remain in weaponized form |
| | (inside rockets, bombs, landmines, and other armaments) in storage igloos at six sites in the US. |
| | Maintaining safety, therefore, must be the priority for the destruction process. |
| | Assuring citizens of the communities near to the facilities that every effort is being made to |
| | minimize risks to their safety and working with these communities to develop sound emergency |
| | response plans are connected but separate tasks. Indeed, many citizens, alarmed by the possible |
| | damage an accidental release during destruction could cause to their communities, have mounted |
| | extensive efforts to address their concerns. Lawsuits over safety measures delayed the |
| | operational testing of the Anniston, Alabama facility, while investigation of an accidental leak that |
| | exposed a worker to an agent at Tooele, Utah caused its facility to cease operation for several |
| | months. |