| | WHAT SAVED THE WHALES? AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 20TH |
| | 1,12 | | MB | CENTURY WHALING |
| | 17 | | stron |
| | 2514 | | ID | University College London |
| | 2002 | | rok |
| | Introduction: explaining the whaling cycle |
| | Global whale catch statistics have been collected since the late 1860s. In the 20th Century, the |
| | data show a sustained increase in global catch until the start of the 1960s after which catches |
| | decline markedly and stocks appear to stabilise. Analysis of the data reveals a whaling cycle very |
| | much as would be expected for an open-access marine resource that is initially abundant but which |
| | then gets successively overexploited, species by species. The resulting scarcity motivated |
| | international efforts to regulate the catch and those regulations determine the current whale stock at |
| | an albeit much reduced level compared to a century ago. But how far were international regulations |
| | the driving force in stabilising whale populations? In this paper we argue that economic forces |
| | leading to reduced catches were at work long before international regulations came into being. To a |
| | considerable extent, therefore, harvests would have stabilised anyway. As others have shown with |
| | respect to various international environmental agreements (e.g. Barrett, 1994), co-operative |
| | international regulation often formalises a non-co-operative outcome, i.e. the outcome that would |
| | have occurred in the absence of the regulation. As such, agreements may be self-enforcing. Such |
| | a conclusion should not detract from co-operative regulatory efforts, but it does suggest that those |
| | efforts are less effective than some political and legal analysts might argue. We identify two basic |
| | economic forces at work. First, as predicted in bio-economic theory (e.g. Clark, 1973, 1990), |
| | declining stocks raise the unit costs of harvest, making whaling ultimately less attractive from a |
| | commercial standpoint. Offsetting this effect is technological change in the whaling industry that |
| | lowered costs for long periods, explaining why the demise of the whaling population takes a |
| | substantial period to materialise. Second, whaling products have substitutes and as these |
| | substitutes became more plentiful, so the commercial incentive to catch whales declined. In order |
| | to isolate the various forces at work, we produce a straightforward econometric analysis of whale |
| | catch time series and the economic factors determining catches. |