| | Military Interest in Low-lethality Biochemical Agents: The |
| | 0,23 | | MB | Historical Interaction of Advocates, Experts, Pragmatists and |
| | 40 | | stron | Politicians |
| | 3543 | | ID | Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation |
| | 2005 | | rok |
| | Table of Contents: |
| | Introduction |
| | Scope of Study |
| | Documentary sources for Significant Groups |
| | CASE STUDY #1: Low-Lethality Irritant Chemical Agents (LLICAs) |
| | Military Use of LLICAs in Combat 1914-1918 |
| | Advocates Save the US Chemical Weapons Service 1919 |
| | LLICAs used 1919-1920 |
| | New LLICAs are developed post WWI |
| | Post-War US Public and Military Sentiment is Strong to Outlaw Chemical Weapons |
| | US CW Advocates press Civilian Use of LLICAs |
| | CW Advocates Lobby Against Bans of Chemical Weapons 1922-1925 |
| | US CW Policy 1925-1935 |
| | Military LLICA use in civil disorders 1932 |
| | US CW Policy 1933-1948 |
| | UK LLICA Policy, 1925-1970 |
| | LLICAs and Violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol in the 1930s |
| | LLICAs in WWII |
| | Advocates stress the potential of CW and BW and effect a softening of US CBW policy in early |
| | Cold War era 1948-1952 |
| | LLICAs in the Korean War 1950-1953 |
| | Military use of LLICAs in Civil Disorders and the introduction of CS gas, 1956-1960 |
| | Fundamental Change in US CBW Policy 1956 |
| | Change in Political Support of CBW and Low Lethality CBPAs 1961-1968 |
| | LLICAs in the Vietnam War Era 1962-1975 |
| | The US contends the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not prohibit LLICAs |
| | The Introduction of CS gas into Civilian Usage |
| | British declare CS gas does not violate the 1925 Geneva Accords |
| | The US Restricts RCA use and ratifies the 1925 Geneva Accords |
| | LLICAs in the Iran-Iraq War |
| | CASE STUDY #2: LOW LETHALITY INCAPACITATING PSYCHOCHEMICAL AGENTS |
| | LLIPAs: Incapacitating Psychochemical (Pharmacological) Agents sought by US 1945-1975. |
| | BZ Standardized 1964 |
| | Limitations of BZ as a LLIPA |
| | LLIPA First Use Disavowed by US 1969 |
| | BZ and LLIPA Program Unilaterally Terminated by US 1980s. |
| | CASE STUDY #3: LOW LETHALITY INFECTIOUS MICROBIAL AGENTS |
| | The Wartime US BW Program |
| | Advocates Save the US BW by promising LLIMAs 1945 |
| | Advocates Limit Expert Oversight of the BW Program 1946-1948 |
| | The Wartime British BW Program |
| | The British Move for a Strategic Low Lethality BW capability. 1946-1954 |
| | The US Imports British Enthusiasm 1948-1953 |
| | The US SAC BW Crash Program: LLIMA by default 1952-1953 |
| | The technical failure of the 1950-1953 US SAC BW Crash Program |
| | The Political failure of the LLIMA US SAC BW Crash Program |
| | Nuclear Weapons replace strategic BW weapons in British and US strategy |
| | Technical factors favor LLIMA development by US 1954-1969 |
| | Human testing favors development of LLIMAs |
| | BW Doctrine Changes emphasize development of LLIMAs 1960-1969 |
| | BW Advocates face renewed skepticism from military pragmatists 1960-1964 |
| | The use of LLICAs in Vietnam raises concerns regarding possible elective use of LLIMAs, 1967- |
| | 1969 |
| | Independent Expert Scientific Groups criticize the US BW program |
| | Opposition to the US BW and CW programs gain Journalistic and Political Support |
| | Political opposition to BW becomes powerful |
| | President Nixon disavows BW weapons, 1969 |
| | CONCLUSIONS |
| | Endnotes |