| | Brittle Power |
| | 1,26 | | MB |
| | 377 | | stron |
| | 3553 | | ID | Rocky Mountain Institute |
| | 2001 | | rok |
| | Contents |
| | Foreword |
| | Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and R. James Woolsey ix |
| | Acknowledgments xi |
| | PART ONE: BRITTLE POWER |
| | One National Energy Insecurity |
| | How did we become so vulnerable? 2 |
| | Purpose and scope 4 |
| | Organization 8 |
| | Two What Can Go Wrong? 10 |
| | Natural events 10 |
| | Deliberate actions 14 |
| | Mistakes 15 |
| | Command, control, and communications disruptions 16 |
| | Three How Systems Fail 19 |
| | Complexity 19 |
| | Many failures from one source 20 |
| | Unpredictable interactions 22 |
| | Tracing higher-order consequences: an illustration 25 |
| | Surprises 27 |
| | Four What Makes the Energy System Vulnerable? 30 |
| | Dangerous materials 31 |
| | Limited public acceptance 33 |
| | Centralization of supplies 34 |
| | Long haul distances 35 |
| | Limited substitutability 36 |
| | Continuity and synchronism in grids 38 |
| | Inflexibilities of energy delivery systems 40 |
| | Interactions between energy systems 42 |
| | High capital intensity 43 |
| | Long lead items 45 |
| | Specialized labor and control requirements 46 |
| | Potential for misuse of energy distribution systems 48 |
| | Chapter Five Case Study: The 1977 New York Blackout 51 |
| | A complex, cascading failure 51 |
| | Human error and oversight 54 |
| | Unexpected complications 55 |
| | Mitigation 57 |
| | Chapter Six Picking Up the Pieces 59 |
| | Spare parts 59 |
| | Repair times, facilities, and skills 60 |
| | Propagating failures 62 |
| | The cost of failure 63 |
| | Chapter Seven War and Terrorism 68 |
| | Centralized facilities as military targets 68 |
| | Protection by dispersion 69 |
| | Energy in jeopardy 70 |
| | Electronic vulnerability 72 |
| | The terrorist threat 74 |
| | Insiders and security lapses 77 |
| | Terrorist resources 78 |
| | A growing danger 83 |
| | PART TWO: DISASTERS WAITING TO HAPPEN |
| | Chapter Eight Liquefied Natural Gas 87 |
| | LNG tankers 91 |
| | LNG terminals and storage tanks 92 |
| | LNG shipments by truck 94 |
| | Analogous hazards of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 95 |
| | The risk from liquefied energy gases (LEG) 98 |
| | Chapter Nine Oil and Gas 100 |
| | Oil and gas fields and shipping facilities 101 |
| | Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 102 |
| | Offshore platforms 105 |
| | Primary oil storage 107 |
| | Oil refineries 109 |
| | Natural gas processing plants 111 |
| | Oil pipelines 112 |
| | Pipeline sabotage and repair 114 |
| | Concentrations of pipeline capacity 116 |
| | Arctic pipelines 117 |
| | Gas pipelines 119 |
| | Total vulnerability 121 |
| | Chapter Ten Power Stations and Grids 123 |
| | Power stations 124 |
| | Electrical transmission 127 |
| | Substations and distribution networks 130 |
| | Control and communications 132 |
| | System stability 134 |
| | Instabilities caused by the grid 136 |
| | Brittleness is increasing 138 |
| | Chapter Eleven Nuclear Power 141 |
| | Nuclear terrorism: intentions and incidents 142 |
| | The potential for reactor sabotage 150 |
| | Other types of attacks on nuclear facilities 154 |
| | Other vulnerabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle 156 |
| | Military attacks on nuclear facilities 158 |
| | Attacking reactors with terrorist bombs 159 |
| | Radiological consequences of major releases 162 |
| | Logistical and financial impacts 165 |
| | Psychological and social impacts 166 |
| | Chapter Twelve Forward, Lemmings! 169 |
| | PART THREE: NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY |
| | Chapter Thirteen Designing for Resilience 177 |
| | Resilience versus reliability 177 |
| | Passive versus active resilience 179 |
| | Resilience in biological systems 182 |
| | Toward a design science for resilience 190 |
| | Analogous universes 207 |
| | The brittleness of mainframe computers 208 |
| | The response: “distributed processing” 210 |
| | Chapter Fourteen Rethinking the Energy System 214 |
| | The semantics of “decentralization” 215 |
| | Centralization: the root of the problem 218 |
| | Social “decentralization”? 219 |
| | The economics of decentralized energy 220 |
| | Can decentralized investments be fast enough? 223 |
| | Renewable sources: the dark horse pulls ahead 225 |
| | A regional case study 227 |
| | Is this a real turning point? 229 |
| | Why should small technologies be faster? 231 |
| | Chapter Fifteen End-Use Efficiency: Most Resilience Per Dollar 235 |
| | The state of the art 238 |
| | Micro benefits 248 |
| | Macro benefits 253 |
| | Economic priorities 257 |
| | National least-cost scenarios 259 |
| | Efficiency is the key to resilience 262 |
| | Chapter Sixteen Inherently Resilient Energy Supplies 264 |
| | Sustainable sources 266 |
| | How reliable are renewable energy flows? 268 |
| | Not all renewable sources make sense 270 |
| | Simplified versions 273 |
| | Quality control 274 |
| | System integration 275 |
| | Linking to the grid: resilience lost? 277 |
| | Technical status of resilient renewable sources 282 |
| | Economic status of resilient renewable sources 283 |
| | External costs and benefits 284 |
| | Built-in resilience 288 |
| | Chapter Achieving Resilience (with Alec Jenkins) 293 |
| | Seventeen The Federal role 293 |
| | Making policy coherent 298 |
| | State programs 300 |
| | Why act now? 301 |
| | What energy dependence costs the community 305 |
| | Creating a sustainable local economy 307 |
| | Getting started 311 |
| | Concerted action 316 |
| | Crisis response 320 |
| | What local governments can do 322 |
| | Financing 323 |
| | Energy services delivery 331 |
| | Resilience begins at home 332 |
| | APPENDICES |
| | Appendix One Scale Issues 335 |
| | Direct construction costs 338 |