Transferring Army BRAC Lands Containing Unexploded Ordnance

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187
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ID RAND Corporation

2004
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Contents

Preface .iii

Figures . ix

Tables xi

Summary xiii

Acknowledgments xxi

Abbreviations .xxiii

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction . 1

BRAC Selection Process . 3

Current Army Process for Transferring Land . 5

Liability Issues Associated with UXO 8

How This Report Is Organized 9

CHAPTER TWO

Fate of Army UXO Land from Previous BRAC Rounds . 11

Transfer Status of Army BRAC Land . 12

Amount of Army BRAC Acreage Affected by UXO 15

Efficiency of Non-UXO Transfers 16

Stalled UXO Transfers . 18

Case Studies: UXO Transfers Have Occurred in Special Circumstances 19

Conclusions . 25

Transferring Army BRAC Lands Containing Unexploded Ordnance

CHAPTER THREE

Factors Affecting UXO Land Transfer in Previous BRAC Rounds. 27

Installations Included in Analysis . 28

Possible Contributing Factors in UXO Land Transfer Delays 29

Funding 29

UXO Information. 30

Remediation Standards 30

DoD Procedures 31

Liability Concerns. 32

Risk Concerns 32

Regulators’ Opinions About Risk 33

Performance of UXO Detection Technology . 33

Multiple but Common Causes of Delays 34

Conclusions . 37

CHAPTER FOUR

Options for Improving Efficiency of Future UXO Land Transfers 41

Previous Actions Taken to Expedite Transfers . 41

Privatization of Cleanup Using Early Transfer 42

Uses of Early Transfer Authority for Conveying UXO Contaminated Property . 44

Privatization of Cleanup Using Conservation Conveyance. 45

Three Options for Expediting UXO Land Transfers . 47

Option 1: Incremental Improvements in the Current Army BRAC

Process . 49

Option 2: Consolidate Transactional Expertise in Army Headquarters 51

Option 3: Creation of a Federal Government Corporation (FGC) to Manage Disposition of All DoD

Lands 53

Potential Disadvantages of an FGC Solution 58

How the FGC Option Would Resolve Land Transfer Barriers . 59

Summary 61

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary of Findings and Recommendations . 63

Findings . 63

Recommendations . 66

APPENDIX

A. Land Transfer Data for Selected Army BRAC Installations. 69

B. Exploring the Potential of the FGC Concept for BRAC Lands . 75

C. Installation Survey . 85

D. Fort Devens, Massachusetts: Low UXO Density, Single Redevelopment Agency, and Financial

Incentives Facilitate Transfer . 93

E. Fort McClellan, Alabama: Shifting Land-Use Decisions and Decisionmaker Involvement Delay

Transfer. 99

F. Fort Meade, Maryland: Congressional Mandates Lead to Rapid Intragovernmental Transfer . 105



G. Fort Ord, California: Surprise UXO Discoveries and Lack of Standards Delay Transfer 109

H. Fort Ritchie, Maryland: Strong Partnership with Community Facilitates Land Lease, But Transfer

Is Slow 117

I. Fort Sheridan, Illinois: Limited UXO Problem, High-Value Real Estate Facilitate Transfer 129

J. Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana: Army Retains Ownership Due to UXO . 133

K. The Presidio of San Francisco, California: Discovery of UXO After Transfer Illustrates Need for

Improved UXO Data 143

L. Savanna Army Depot, Illinois: Lack of Standards Delays Transfer . 149

References 157