| | CORRUPTION, FISCAL POLICY, AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT |
| | 2,41 | | MB |
| | 248 | | stron |
| | 4020 | | ID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| | 2005 | | rok |
| | TABLE OF CONTENTS |
| | 1. Corruption, Fiscal Policy, and Fiscal Management |
| | 1.1 Overview of this study |
| | 1.2 Defining corruption. |
| | 1.3 Corruption in the world. |
| | 1.4 Stakeholders in the fight against corruption. |
| | 1.5 Concluding Remarks. |
| | 2. The Economics of Corruption. |
| | 2.1 Motivation versus windows of opportunity |
| | 2.2 A conceptual model of corruption |
| | 2.3 The economics of corruption control |
| | 2.4 Quantifying corruption |
| | 2.4.1 Non- survey-based measurements. |
| | 2.4.2 Measuring corruption using perception-surveys |
| | 3. Fiscal Dimensions of Corruption |
| | 3.1 Corruption in Public Revenue Collections. |
| | 3.2.1 Revenue collections and corruption: motivations for corruption. |
| | 3.2.2 Revenue collections and corruption: Opportunities for corruption |
| | 3.2 Corruption on the Expenditure Side of the Budget. |
| | 3.2.1 Motivations for Corruption on the Expenditure Side of the Budget |
| | 3.2.2 Opportunities for Corruption: Administrative (Bureaucratic) Corruption in Government |
| | Expenditures |
| | 3.2.3 Opportunities for Corruption: Political “capture” of government expenditures |
| | 3.3 Quasi - Fiscal Corruption |
| | 3.3.1 Privatization |
| | 3.3.2 Excessive Regulation of Markets. |
| | 3.3.3 Corruption in Pricing of Public Utilities |
| | 3.3.4 Corruption in Natural Resource Exploitation |
| | 3.4 Concluding Remarks. |
| | 4. Fiscal Responses to Reduce Corruption. |
| | 4.1 Reducing Corruption in the Collection of Revenues |
| | 4.1.1 Reducing Motivations for Corruption on the Revenue Side of the Budget. |
| | 4.1.2 Reducing opportunities for corruption on the revenue side of the budget |
| | 4.1.3 Programmatic responses to reducing corruption on the revenue side. |
| | 4.2 Reducing Corruption on the Expenditure Side of the Budget |
| | 4.2.1. Reducing Motivations for Corruption in Government Spending. |
| | 4.2.2 Reducing the Opportunities for Administrative Corruption in Government Expenditures |
| | 4.2.3 Reducing the opportunities for political corruption. |
| | 4.2.4 Programmatic responses to reducing corruption on the expenditure side . |
| | 4.3 Reducing Quasi-Fiscal Corruption. |
| | 4.3.1 Corruption and privatization |
| | 4.3.2 Market Regulation. |
| | 4.3.3 Pricing of Public Utilities and Natural Resource Exploitation |
| | 4.4 Decentralization as a Programmatic Response to Corruption |
| | 4.4.1 Expenditure decentralization |
| | 4.4.2 Revenue decentralization |
| | 4.4.3 Intergovernmental transfers system |
| | 4.5 Other Programmatic Responses to Corruption. |
| | 4.5.1 Anticorruption commissions or bureaus |
| | 4.5.2 Legislative and judicial responses. |
| | 4.5.3 Strengthening the role of civil society and the private sector |
| | 4.6 Concluding Remarks. |
| | Annex 4.A - Peru: Tax Ratios. |
| | Annex 4.B - Budget Institutions and Corruption |
| | 5. Regional Patterns of Corruption. |
| | 5.1 Regional differences in the extent and nature of corruption. |
| | 5.1.1 Sub-Saharan Africa |
| | 5.1.2 Latin America and the Caribbean |
| | 5.1.3 Western Europe |
| | 5.1.4 East Europe and Central Asia |
| | 5.1.4 South Asia |
| | 5.1.5 East Asia and Pacific. |
| | 5.1.6 Middle East and North Africa |
| | 5.1.7 North America.180 |
| | 5.2 Concluding remarks. |
| | Annex 5.A - Regional Patterns of Corruption |
| | 6. A Case Study in Corruption and Anti-Corruption Responses. |
| | 6. 1 Corruption and Anticorruption Responses in Tanzania |
| | 6.1.1 A Synopsis of Corruption in Tanzania. |
| | 6.1.2 Strengthening government revenue collections. |
| | 6.1.3 Reform of expenditure management |
| | 6.1.4 Local government reform |
| | 6.1.5 Others Responses - Strengthening of anti-corruption framework. |
| | 7. Summary, Policy Lessons, and Practical Guidelines. |