| | An Attack on Iraq: The Military, Political, and Economic |
| | 0,08 | | MB | Consequences - Scenario Briefing |
| | 28 | | stron |
| | 4524 | | ID | Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) |
| | 2003 | | rok |
| | Table of Contents |
| | I. THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC FACTORS SHAPING AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC |
| | CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK ON IRAQ 3 |
| | II. THE UNCERTAIN PRELUDE TO WAR 4 |
| | III. WHAT HAPPENS IF UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA “SUCCEED” . 5 |
| | IV. WILD CARDS AND POSSIBLE CAUSES OF WAR THAT ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE |
| | US/BRITISH DESIRED TIMING 6 |
| | V. IF WAR COMES: THE KEY IRAQI POLITICAL VARIABLES 7 |
| | VI. IRAQ WARFIGHTING AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 8 |
| | VII. OTHER SERIOUS “WILD CARDS” INCLUDE THE ACTIONS OF IRAQ’S NEIGHBORS 9 |
| | VIII. IF WAR COMES: IRAQI TACTICAL MILITARY ISSUES 10 |
| | IX. “INTANGIBLES” AND UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING IRAQI TACTICAL WARFIGHTING |
| | CAPABILITY INEVITABLY AFFECT ANY ASSESSMENT OF WAR FIGHTING SCENARIOS . 11 |
| | X. IF WAR COMES: HOW THE US AND BRITAIN WILL FIGHT 12 |
| | XI. US AND BRITISH WAR PLANS RAISE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES REGARDING THE US |
| | STRATEGIC POSITION AND THE LIMITS TO US AND BRITISH WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES |
| | 13 |
| | XII. WAR FIGHTING SCENARIOS. 14 |
| | XIII. BEST CASE: IRAQ ONLY/QUICK VICTORY . 15 |
| | XIV. BEST CASE: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC FORECASTING . 16 |
| | XV. INTERMEDIATE CASE: LIGHT DAMAGE TO OIL FACILITIES/OIL MARKET BECOMES |
| | POLITICALLY UNSTABLE. 17 |
| | XVI. INTERMEDIATE CASE: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC FORECASTING 18 |
| | XVII. THE “WORST CASE:” ENOUGH GOES WRONG TO HAVE A MAJOR GLOBAL IMPACT – |
| | PART ONE . 19 |
| | XVIII. THE “WORST CASE:” ENOUGH GOES WRONG TO HAVE A MAJOR GLOBAL IMPACT – |
| | PART TWO 20 |
| | XIX. THE “WORST CASE:” ENOUGH GOES WRONG TO HAVE A MAJOR GLOBAL IMPACT – |
| | IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC FORECASTING 21 |
| | XX. KEY WARTIME UNCERTAINTIES AND EFFECTS 22 |
| | XXI. KEY ISSUES AFFECTING CONFLICT TERMINATION AND POST WAR ECONOMIC |
| | EFFECTS. 23 |
| | XXII. THE FOLLOWING KEY VARIABLES WILL HELP DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF THE |
| | PEACE 24 |
| | XXIII. ECONOMICS MAY BE MORE URGENT THAN POLITICS:. 25 |
| | XXIV. OIL FACTOR 26 |
| | XXV. IRAQ’S FINANCIAL BURDEN 27 |
| | XXVI. DISARMAMENT CHALLENGE 28 |