| | Russia’s Tactical/Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons - Part I: |
| | 0,28 | | MB | Background and Policy Issues |
| | 51 | | stron |
| | 5401 | | ID | Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) |
| | 2003 | | rok |
| | Contents |
| | I-0.0 Introduction to Part I 7 |
| | I-0.0 Introduction to Part I 7 |
| | I-1.0 Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Force Structure. 8 |
| | I-1.1 Total Scope . 8 |
| | I-1.2 Strategic Nuclear Forces 9 |
| | I-1.3 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. 9 |
| | I-1.4 Tactical Nuclear Forces . 9 |
| | I-1.4.1 Definitions 9 |
| | I-1.4.2 Tactical Nuclear Force Deployments and Reductions Prior to 1992 11 |
| | I-1.4.3 1991/1992 Unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 12 |
| | I-2.0 Baseline Numerical Estimates . 14 |
| | I-3.0 1992-2003 Tactical Nuclear Force Developments 18 |
| | I-3.1 The Withdrawal from Ukraine. 19 |
| | I-3.2 Within Russia 21 |
| | I-4.0 Recent Developments in Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Forces Policy . 24 |
| | I-4.1 Early Post-Cold War Russian Military Policies. 24 |
| | I-4.2 The 1999 Russian Security Council Meeting 27 |
| | I-4.3 The “Zapad-99” Military Exercises . 28 |
| | I-4.4 The 2000 Russian Policy Statements. 30 |
| | I-4.4.1 The National Security Concept. 30 |
| | I-1.4.2 The Military Doctrine . 31 |
| | I-1.4.3 The Foreign Policy Concept . 33 |
| | I-4.5 Nuclear Policy Debates in 2000. 34 |
| | I-4.6 The Kaliningrad Controversy 35 |
| | I-4.7 Other Official Declarations with Respect to Tactical Nuclear Weapons Issues 37 |
| | I-5.0 Perceived Threats to Russia’s Security: Why Russia Thinks it Requires Tactical Nuclear |
| | Weapons 38 |
| | I-5.1 The Western Front and NATO Expansion 39 |
| | I-5.2 The Eastern Front and the Issue of China 41 |
| | I-5.3 The Southern Front and Central Asia 44 |
| | I-5.4 Other Russian Security Concerns 45 |
| | I-6.0 Future Prospects for Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons. 45 |
| | I-6.1 Implications for European NATO Countries 45 |
| | I-6.2 Implications for Non-NATO European Countries. 47 |
| | I-6.3 Implications for the United States . 47 |
| | I-6.4 Implications for China . 48 |
| | I-6.5 Implications for Central Asia and Russia’s Southern Region . 48 |
| | I-7.0 Conclusions to Part I.. 49 |
| | Foreword: Ambassador Jonathan Dean . 4 |
| | Foreword: Rt. Hon. Menzies Campbell MP 6 |
| | Executive Summary . 7 |
| | Acronyms and Abbreviations . 13 |
| | Introduction 14 |
| | CHAPTER 1: Public Policy: New Nukes Debut in US Planning 17 |
| | 1.1 The Nuclear Posture Review Sets the Scene . 17 |
| | 1.2 Technological Considerations . 20 |
| | 1.3 The Question of Testing . 25 |
| | 1.4 New Nuclear Weapons and Congress . 27 |
| | 1.5 Is US Deterrence Credible? . 29 |
| | CHAPTER 2: Low-Yield Nukes: Old Ideas with a New Twist . 32 |
| | 2.1 Development Of US Nuclear Policy, 1990-2000 32 |
| | 2.2 Hardened Targets: The DoD/DOE Response Since 1990 . 38 |
| | CHAPTER 3: How US Choices Affect Global Security . 45 |
| | 3.1 NATO – The Alliance Under Pressure 45 |
| | 3.2 UK-US Nuclear Relations . 49 |
| | 3.3 Global Agreements at Stake 53 |
| | 3.4 Regional Impacts . 61 |
| | CHAPTER 4: Conclusions and Recommendations 71 |
| | 4.1 Immediate Steps to Prevent the Development and Testing of New Weapons . 72 |
| | 4.2 Confronting Security Threats: Negotiations, Not Nukes 73 |
| | Endnotes . 76 |