| | Guardians at the Gates of Hell: Estimating the Risk of Nuclear |
| | 3,36 | | MB | Theft and Terrorism and Identifying the Highest-Priority Risks |
| | 466 | | stron | of Nuclear Theft |
| | 5419 | | ID | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| | 2007 | | rok |
| | Table of Contents |
| | 1. INTRODUCTION.13 |
| | ESTIMATING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 14 |
| | IDENTIFYING THE HIGHEST-PRIORITY RISKS OF NUCLEAR THEFT 17 |
| | UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE |
| | 18 |
| | LITERATURE REVIEW. 19 |
| | THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 19 |
| | IDENTIFYING THE HIGHEST-PRIORITY RISKS OF NUCLEAR THEFT . 25 |
| | UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM – AND ASSESSING TOOLS |
| | FOR CHANGE 28 |
| | BOUNDARIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 29 |
| | DEFINITIONS 31 |
| | PLAN OF THE STUDY 33 |
| | 2. THE GLOBAL THREAT OF NUCLEAR THEFT AND TERRORISM: A QUALITATIVE |
| | ASSESSMENT 35 |
| | THE DEMAND FOR BLACK-MARKET NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EXPERTISE 35 |
| | AL QAEDA AND THE GLOBAL JIHADIST NETWORK. 37 |
| | AUM SHINRIKYO. 44 |
| | CHECHEN TERRORISTS 47 |
| | IRAQ 51 |
| | IRAN 56 |
| | THE DEMAND IS THERE . 59 |
| | TERRORIST NUCLEAR WEAPON CONSTRUCTION: HOW DIFFICULT? . 59 |
| | COULD TERRORISTS PRODUCE THEIR OWN BOMB MATERIAL? . 66 |
| | SETTING OFF A STOLEN NUCLEAR WEAPON. 67 |
| | HOW MUCH DO AL QAEDA’S WEAKNESSES REDUCE THE DANGER?. 69 |
| | SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILES 71 |
| | TRANSPORT. 80 |
| | RATES OF CHANGE 82 |
| | WIDELY VARYING NUCLEAR SECURITY 85 |
| | NUCLEAR SECURITY IN RUSSIA – YESTERDAY AND TODAY. 89 |
| | THE THREAT FROM RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL . 99 |
| | SECURITY OF PAKISTAN’S STOCKPILE 101 |
| | A GLOBAL THREAT . 102 |
| | 3. THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A MATHEMATICAL MODEL111 |
| | CHOOSING A MODELING APPROACH . 112 |
| | INTRODUCING THE MODEL . 116 |
| | A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE. 119 |
| | ASSESSING EACH OF THE FACTORS – AND POLICIES TO INFLUENCE THEM. 122 |
| | THE NUMBER OF PLAUSIBLE NUCLEAR TERRORIST GROUPS, NN . 122 |
| | THE YEARLY PROBABILITY OF AN ACQUISITION ATTEMPT, PA(J) 124 |
| | THE PROBABILITIES OF OUTSIDER THEFT ATTEMPTS, PO(J) AND POS(J,K) 126 |
| | The Design Basis Threat and Conditional Risk. 127 |
| | The Distributions of Security Levels and Terrorist Capabilities . 129 |
| | Examples of the Effect of Security Upgrades in Reducing Risk . 140 |
| | Effect of Quantity of Material . 141 |
| | Effect of Number of Facilities and Transport Legs . 142 |
| | THE PROBABILITIES OF INSIDER THEFT ATTEMPTS, PI(J) AND PIS(J,K) 143 |
| | Effect of the Quantity of Material and Facility Throughput 145 |
| | Effect of the Number of Personnel 146 |
| | THE PROBABILITIES OF BLACK-MARKET ACQUISITION ATTEMPTS, PB(J) AND PBS(J,K) . 146 |
| | THE PROBABILITIES OF ACQUISITION FROM NATION-STATES, PN(J) AND PNS(J,K) . 151 |
| | THE PROBABILITY TERRORISTS COULD MAKE A NUCLEAR BOMB OR DETONATE A STOLEN |
| | NUCLEAR WEAPON, PW(J,K) . 153 |
| | THE PROBABILITY TERRORISTS WOULD DELIVER A NUCLEAR BOMB, PD(J,K). 157 |
| | THE CONSEQUENCES OF A TERRORIST NUCLEAR ATTACK, CC . 157 |
| | THE DYNAMICS OF THE SYSTEM 158 |
| | CONCLUSIONS . 159 |
| | 4. IDENTIFYING THE HIGHEST RISKS OF NUCLEAR THEFT161 |
| | THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THEFT RISK. 165 |
| | AN ILLUSTRATION: NUCLEAR THEFT RISKS IN TWO HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRIES. 168 |
| | PREFERENCE VS. PROBABILITY . 170 |
| | THE PROBABILISTIC SPECTRUM OF CAPABILITIES OF PLAUSIBLE THIEVES 170 |
| | ASSESSING THE THREATS ADVERSARIES POSE AT DIFFERENT FACILITIES 180 |
| | THE FACILITY ENVIRONMENT’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE THREAT 184 |
| | ASSESSING THE THREATS SECURITY SYSTEMS CAN DEFEAT 184 |
| | THE PROBABILISTIC SPECTRUM OF PLAUSIBLE RECIPIENT CAPABILITIES 192 |
| | TERRORIST VS. STATE RECIPIENTS 194 |
| | CATEGORIZING NUCLEAR MATERIALS: WHAT MATERIALS SHOULD GET WHAT LEVELS OF |
| | PROTECTION? . 196 |
| | CURRENT APPROACHES TO CATEGORIZING NUCLEAR MATERIALS . 198 |
| | GRADED SAFEGUARDS, OR CLIFFED SAFEGUARDS? . 204 |
| | DIFFERENT MATERIALS AND THE SPECTRUM OF RECIPIENT CAPABILITIES . 208 |
| | THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GUN-TYPE AND IMPLOSION-TYPE BOMBS. 212 |
| | MATERIAL QUANTITY AND THEFT RISK 217 |
| | MATERIAL QUALITY AND THEFT RISK 220 |
| | PLUTONIUM VS. HEU AS A TERRORIST NUCLEAR BOMB MATERIAL . 221 |
| | ISOTOPIC BARRIERS: URANIUM. 222 |
| | Increased Critical Mass 222 |
| | Increased Risk of Pre-Initiation . 223 |
| | Decreased Explosive Yield 224 |
| | Uranium Isotopic Barriers: Summary 225 |
| | ISOTOPIC BARRIERS: PLUTONIUM . 226 |
| | Increased Risk of Pre-Initiation . 227 |
| | Increased Heat . 228 |
| | Increased Radiation . 230 |
| | Increased Critical Mass 230 |
| | Reduced Yield . 230 |
| | Increased Detectability 231 |
| | Summary of Plutonium Isotopic Barriers 231 |
| | ISOTOPIC BARRIERS: U-233 AND OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE ISOTOPES. 233 |
| | MASS AND SIZE BARRIERS 236 |
| | CHEMICAL BARRIERS 239 |
| | RADIOLOGICAL BARRIERS. 243 |
| | Radiological Barriers to the Initial Theft. 243 |
| | Radiological Contributions to Post-Theft Detectability 245 |
| | Radiological Barriers to Processing. 246 |
| | Summary of Radiological Barriers 247 |
| | THE CASE OF FRESH OR IRRADIATED RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL 248 |
| | THE CASE OF UNIRRADIATED PLUTONIUM-URANIUM MIXED OXIDE (MOX) FUEL 253 |
| | RISKS POSED BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 257 |
| | WEAPON TECHNICAL SAFEGUARDS 257 |
| | QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTAINED IN A WEAPON 258 |
| | WEAPON SIZE AND MASS 259 |
| | TACTICAL VS. STRATEGIC WEAPONS 259 |
| | STOLEN WEAPONS VS. STOLEN MATERIALS. 260 |
| | IMPLICATIONS: A NEW APPROACH TO CATEGORIZING NUCLEAR MATERIALS 261 |
| | IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 265 |
| | SUMMARIZING THE PROPOSED METHOD. 265 |
| | A FIRST CUT AT APPLYING THE METHOD. 267 |
| | ASSESSING THREAT LEVELS 268 |
| | ASSESSING OVERALL NUCLEAR THEFT RISKS: TWO APPROACHES 271 |
| | Russia 274 |
| | Pakistan. 276 |
| | United States 276 |
| | Canada 278 |
| | Japan . 280 |
| | Uzbekistan . 283 |
| | Unnamed Country 286 |
| | USING BOTH RISK AND OPPORTUNITY TO PRIORITIZE ACTION 293 |
| | 5. THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM.295 |
| | SYSTEM COMPONENTS AND ARCHITECTURE 295 |
| | SYSTEM PROPERTIES AND BEHAVIOR 300 |
| | SYSTEM DRIVERS: INCIDENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS . 300 |
| | SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS I: COMPLACENCY, STRUCTURAL DISINCENTIVES, AND POLICY |
| | RESISTANCE 305 |
| | NUCLEAR REGULATION WITHIN THE OVERALL SYSTEM . 310 |
| | SYSTEM TIME LAGS, DELAYS, AND LOCK-IN 312 |
| | AN EXAMPLE OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR WITHIN ONE COUNTRY . 314 |
| | SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS II: SECRECY AND SOVEREIGNTY 319 |
| | AN INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLE OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR: RESPONDING TO 9/11 321 |
| | POLICY TOOLS FOR IMPROVING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE. 324 |
| | BINDING MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS. 326 |
| | INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 332 |
| | INTERNATIONAL PEER REVIEWS . 335 |
| | INTERNATIONAL TRAINING AND GUIDANCE . 338 |
| | SUPPLIER REQUIREMENTS . 340 |
| | TECHNICAL COOPERATION 342 |
| | MATERIAL REMOVALS 346 |
| | SOME OVERALL LESSONS FROM PAST EFFORTS TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR SECURITY 351 |
| | 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS353 |
| | HOW BIG IS THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM? 353 |
| | HOW CAN WE ASSESS WHERE THE BIGGEST RISKS LIE? 355 |
| | WHAT POLICY TOOLS ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE? . 356 |
| | EXTENDABLE KNOWLEDGE 359 |