| | Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions: Toward a Long-Term |
| | 0,86 | | MB | Strategy |
| | 187 | | stron |
| | 5738 | | ID | RAND Corporation |
| | 2004 | | rok |
| | Contents |
| | Preface. iii |
| | Figures and Tables ix |
| | Summary xi |
| | Acknowledgments xxi |
| | Glossary .xxiii |
| | CHAPTER ONE |
| | Introduction.1 |
| | Organization of This Report.4 |
| | CHAPTER TWO |
| | Analytic Approach 7 |
| | Some Conceptual Building Blocks.7 |
| | A Definition for Anti-Access Strategies .8 |
| | The Access Game .8 |
| | A Stylized Representation of a Deployment 12 |
| | Characterization of Potential Anti-Access Vulnerabilities 13 |
| | Quantitative Analysis of Military Utility 14 |
| | Seminar-Style Gaming. 15 |
| | CHAPTER THREE |
| | Southwest Asian Theater: An Iraq Game 19 |
| | Overview of the Game . 19 |
| | The Scenario 20 |
| | Actors, Objectives, CONOPs, and Capabilities 22 |
| | Findings 26 |
| | Key Access Issues 26 |
| | Threats of Greatest Concern 30 |
| | Other Threats Considered 34 |
| | Implications for Regional Commanders . 34 |
| | Access Requirements 34 |
| | Options for Commander, CENTCOM 38 |
| | CHAPTER FOUR |
| | The Pacific Theater: A PRC-Taiwan Game . 43 |
| | Overview of the Game . 43 |
| | The Scenario 44 |
| | Actors, Objectives, CONOPs, and Capabilities 44 |
| | Findings 50 |
| | Key Access Issues 51 |
| | Threats of Greatest Concern 53 |
| | Other Threats Considered 57 |
| | Implications for Regional Commanders . 58 |
| | Access Requirements 59 |
| | Options for the PACOM Commander. 61 |
| | CHAPTER FIVE |
| | European Theater: A Russia-Baltics Game 65 |
| | Overview of the Game . 65 |
| | The Scenario 65 |
| | Actors, Objectives, CONOPs, and Capabilities 68 |
| | Findings 72 |
| | Key Access Issues 72 |
| | Threats of Greatest Concern 75 |
| | Other Threats Considered 79 |
| | Implications for Regional Commanders . 82 |
| | Access Requirements 82 |
| | Options for the Commander of EUCOM 84 |
| | CHAPTER SIX |
| | Latin America and the Caribbean . 87 |
| | Contents vii |
| | Overview of the Games 87 |
| | The Scenarios . 88 |
| | Potential Adversaries in Latin America and the Caribbean 88 |
| | Indigenous Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups. 89 |
| | Nonindigenous Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups 90 |
| | Regional Conventional Militaries. 91 |
| | Findings 92 |
| | Threats of Greatest Concern 93 |
| | Implications for Regional Commanders . 94 |
| | Access Requirements 94 |
| | Options for the Commander of SOUTHCOM 95 |
| | CHAPTER SEVEN |
| | What the Games Revealed About Anti-Access Threats . 97 |
| | Anti-Access Threats of Greatest Concern.100 |
| | Ballistic and Cruise Missiles: A Threat to Bases, Leaders, and Populations.101 |
| | Extended-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles: A Threat to Air Mobility.104 |
| | Antiship Missiles, Attack Submarines, and Sea Mining: Threats to Sealift 105 |
| | Wild-Card Capabilities 107 |
| | CHAPTER EIGHT |
| | Toward a Strategy for Assuring Access .115 |
| | Peacetime Activities .117 |
| | Assuring Partners and Allies .118 |
| | Deterring Adversaries 119 |
| | Maintaining and Developing New Options .120 |
| | Investments in Self-Defense by U.S. Partners and Allies 126 |
| | Crisis and Wartime Activities.126 |
| | Deploying and Defending .127 |
| | Improving, Seizing, or Building Access127 |
| | Protecting Forces and Bases of Operation .128 |
| | The Question of Costs.129 |
| | CHAPTER NINE |
| | Conclusions and Implications 131 |
| | Implications for Intelligence Needs.131 |
| | Strategic Intelligence .131 |
| | Operational Military Intelligence 133 |
| | Technical Intelligence134 |
| | Commercial Intelligence .135 |
| | Implications for Transformation Management.136 |
| | Bibliography 141 |