| | Dead on Time – arms transportation, brokering and the threat to |
| | 1,31 | | MB | human rights |
| | 150 | | stron |
| | 6232 | | ID | Amnesty International |
| | 2006 | | rok |
| | Table of Contents |
| | TABLE OF BOXES AND MAPS. 1 |
| | DEFINITIONS 2 |
| | 1. INTRODUCTION 3 |
| | FACING THE SQUEEZE - EXPORT SOUTH 5 |
| | STATES FAILING TO ADDRESS THE CHAIN . 7 |
| | 2. THE PROBLEM OF DELIVERY – SOME ILLUSTRATIONS 11 |
| | CHINESE AND US ARMS TO NEPAL – BY TRUCK AND BY AIR 11 |
| | BROKERING LOGISTICS FOR US CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS 14 |
| | ARMS BROKERS AND TRAFFICKING TO THE COLOMBIAN PARAMILITARIES. 16 |
| | THE KARIN CAT – HELPING PREPARE A MAJOR INVASION 18 |
| | ARMS FROM BRAZIL SEIZED IN SOUTH AFRICA 20 |
| | INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING NETWORK FOR ARMS FROM CHINA TO LIBERIA. 22 |
| | 3. ORGANIZING MILITARY SUPPLY CHAINS AND ARMS TRANSFERS. 28 |
| | ARMS TRANSFERS BY SEA . 32 |
| | ARMS TRANSFERS BY AIR 35 |
| | THE ARMS LOGISTICS CHAIN – WHO’S WHO? 38 |
| | 4. THE LOGISTICS REVOLUTION AND ITS MILITARY CONSEQUENCES. 41 |
| | MILITARY LOGISTICS 41 |
| | OUTSOURCING DEFENCE LOGISTICS . 44 |
| | THE CREATION OF “GREY” DEFENCE LOGISTICS MARKETS. 47 |
| | THE CASE OF UKRAINIAN CARGO AIRWAYS. 50 |
| | US QUEST TO CONTROL INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 52 |
| | CONTAINER SECURITY AND THE US “WAR ON TERROR” 53 |
| | 5. ARMS BROKERAGE AND THE RISK OF DIVERSION. 58 |
| | THE CASE OF LEONID MININ AND ITS OUTCOME . 60 |
| | NATIONAL LAWS ON ARMS BROKERAGE ACTIVITIES . 63 |
| | WEAK DEFINITIONS 64 |
| | THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACH 65 |
| | OTHER APPROACHES. 68 |
| | EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY 70 |
| | LICENSING SYSTEMS AND ETHICAL CRITERIA . 71 |
| | REGISTRATION AND OTHER CONTROLS ON BROKERING, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT |
| | PERSONNEL 73 |
| | 6. ARMS TRANSFERS AND ROUTES IN AFRICA 78 |
| | AFRICA’S ARMS ROUTES TO CONFLICTS AND REPRESSION . 81 |
| | AFRICA’S TRANSPORT NETWORKS AND ARMS TRANSFERS. 86 |
| | SEA-BORNE TRADE . 86 |
| | AIR-BORNE TRADE 89 |
| | LAND ROUTES 92 |
| | 7. THE LOGISTICS OF MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS. 93 |
| | “OPERATION ALLIED FORCE” IN THE BALKANS . 94 |
| | “OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM” IN AFGHANISTAN . 97 |
| | “OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM,” THE EARLY PHASES . 100 |
| | 8. BROKERING A COVERT ARMS SUPPLY OPERATION. 104 |
| | “PEELING THE SKIN OF AN ONION”– ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY. 107 |
| | US SPONSORED ARMS BROKERING AND FREIGHTING NETWORK. 109 |
| | CROATIAN, SWISS AND UK BROKERS 111 |
| | AIR CARRIERS AND THE LACK OF DELIVERY VERIFICATION . 113 |
| | ISRAELI, SWISS AND UK FIRMS AND EXPORTS FROM SERBIA & MONTENEGRO 118 |
| | AIRLINE COMPANIES INVOLVED IN SERBIAN ARMS EXPORTS . 119 |
| | WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ARMS DELIVERIES AND STOCKPILES IN IRAQ? 121 |
| | 9. THE CURRENT UN FRAMEWORK – TOO SLOW AND LIMITED 122 |
| | THE UN CONSULTATIONS ON BROKERING IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS . 123 |
| | UN DISCUSSION OF ARMS TRANSPORTATION 126 |
| | THE FORTHCOMING GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS . 132 |
| | 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 133 |
| | NATIONAL LEGAL REFORM 135 |
| | GLOBAL STANDARDS 136 |
| | KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:. 138 |
| | TO ALL STATES . 138 |
| | TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 141 |
| | THE TRANSPORT INDUSTRY: 142 |
| | APPENDIX 1 . 144 |
| | GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. 144 |
| | PRINCIPLE 1: RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES 144 |
| | PRINCIPLE 2: EXPRESS LIMITATIONS 144 |
| | PRINCIPLE 3: LIMITATIONS BASED ON USE OR LIKELY USE 145 |
| | PRINCIPLE 4: FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 146 |
| | PRINCIPLE 5: TRANSPARENCY . 146 |
| | PRINCIPLE 6: COMPREHENSIVE CONTROLS. 147 |
| | The authors of this report are Amnesty International and TransArms, Research Centre for the |
| | Logistics of Arms Transfers.1 |