| | Destroying Weapons of Coal, Air and Water: A Critical Evaluation |
| | 2,03 | | MB | of the American Policy of German Industrial Demilitarization |
| | 514 | | stron | 1945-1952 |
| | 6259 | | ID | Philipps-Universität Marburg |
| | 2007 | | rok |
| | TABLE OF CONTENTS |
| | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ii |
| | LIST OF TABLES vi |
| | INTRODUCTION. 1 |
| | 0.1 Opening and Thesis Statements. 1 |
| | 0.2 Historiography and Methodology 4 |
| | 0.3 The Interrelationship of Civilian and Military Industries. 17 |
| | 0.4 A Note on Sources 22 |
| | CHAPTER 1: Dual-Use Industry and Prewar Military Mobilization 23 |
| | 1.1 Introduction . 23 |
| | 1.2 American Civilian Industry and Rearmament 24 |
| | 1.3 German War Industries and Rearmament. 29 |
| | 14 Misperceptions of Prewar German Mobilization 37 |
| | 1.5 The Failure of German Industry in War 43 |
| | 1.6 Conclusion. 48 |
| | CHAPTER 2: Strategic Bombing and Industrial Demilitarization 50 |
| | 2.1 Introduction . 50 |
| | 2.2 Strategic Bombing Origins and the Demilitarization Panacea. 50 |
| | 2.3 Bombing Operations in Wartime. 56 |
| | 2.4 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey and Industrial Disruption 61 |
| | 2.5 The Impact of Strategic Bombing on Industrial Capacities . 69 |
| | 2.6 Urban Bombing and the Misunderstanding of the "Wasteland" . 78 |
| | 2.7 Conclusion. 85 |
| | CHAPTER 3: The Origins of Industrial Demilitarization 88 |
| | 3.1 Introduction . 88 |
| | 3.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Policies and the German Future 88 |
| | 3.3 The Hard Soviet Peace and German Pastoralization 93 |
| | 3.4 The Liberal-Capitalist Nature of Early American Occupation Policy 99 |
| | 3.5 The Morgenthau Plan: An Attempt at Policy Clarification 107 |
| | 3.6 Directive J.C.S. 1067: The “Technical” Compromise . 114 |
| | 3.7 The Yalta Shock: The Masked Incongruity of Allied Positions 119 |
| | 3.8 Conclusion. 125 |
| | CHAPTER 4: The Collapse of Dismantling as a Method. 127 |
| | 4.1 Introduction . 127 |
| | 4.2 The Revisionist Portrayal of Harry S. Truman . 127 |
| | 4.3 Truman’s Views Concerning the Soviet Union and Germany 133 |
| | 4.4 The Blanket Soviet Seizure of Reparations. 142 |
| | 4.5 Reparations at Potsdam and Reactions to Soviet Moral Abandon 145 |
| | 4.6 Conclusion. 157 |
| | CHAPTER 5: The Early Stages of Industrial Demilitarization. 160 |
| | 5.1 Introduction 160 |
| | 5.2 The Contradictions of Demilitarization Policy . 160 |
| | 5.3 The Level of Industry Plan and Clay’s Reparations Stop . 171 |
| | 5.4 Paperclip, Safehaven and Hidden Reparations . 186 |
| | 5.5 An Imprecise Policy of Industrial Demilitarization in Action. 192 |
| | 5.6 Feeding Workers as a Structural Constraint 198 |
| | 5.7 Conclusion. 206 |
| | CHAPTER 6: The Militarization of Policy and Views of German Industry. 207 |
| | 6.1 Introduction . 207 |
| | 6.2 The Joint Intelligence Committee and Washington’s Perceptions of Conflict. 208 |
| | 6.3 The American “Shift” and the Impact on Demilitarization 214 |
| | 6.4 Byrnes' Speech and the Official Change of Heart . 225 |
| | 6.5 Conclusion. 227 |
| | CHAPTER 7: The Marshall Plan and the End of Demilitarization 230 |
| | 7.1 Introduction . 230 |
| | 7.2 George C. Marshall and the Solidification of the New Course . 232 |
| | 7.3 The Truman Doctrine . 240 |
| | 7.4 The Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference of March 1947 244 |
| | 7.5 The Harvard Speech, Marshall Plan and Soviet Rejection 252 |
| | 7.6 Policy Revision: The Incongruity of Demilitarization with Recovery 258 |
| | 7.7 Conclusion. 262 |
| | CHAPTER 8: Explaining the German Productivity Boom 264 |
| | 8.1 Introduction . 264 |
| | 8.2 The Dismantling of Rheinmetall Borsig-Alkett and Intervention . 265 |
| | 8.3 The Joint Logistics Committee and Dual-Use Calculations 274 |
| | 8.4 The Demilitarization-Marshall Plan Contradiction 280 |
| | 8.5 The Marshall Plan and Western German Industrial Recovery 287 |
| | 8.6 Conclusion. 294 |
| | CHAPTER 9: Military Radicalization . 296 |
| | 9.1 Introduction . 296 |
| | 9.2 The Berlin Blockade and Other Disasters. 297 |
| | 9.3 Perceptions of the Soviet Military and Stalin’s Plans for War 304 |
| | 9.4 The Military Defense Assistance Program 314 |
| | 9.5 The Atlantic Military Alliance System and American Designs 324 |
| | 9.6 The National Security Council Memorandum No. 68 and the German Role 329 |
| | 9.7 Conclusion. 333 |
| | CHAPTER 10: Rearmament and Military Industrial Capacities. 335 |
| | 10.1 Introduction . 335 |
| | 10.2 Konrad Adenauer and the Issue of German National Security 336 |
| | 10.3 The Korean War and the 1950s War Scare. 342 |
| | 10.4 Domestic and Foreign Pressures against Visible Remilitarization 347 |
| | 10.5 The German Perspective on Dual-Use Matters 353 |
| | 10.6 Conclusion. 361 |
| | CONCLUSION 363 |
| | 11.1 The Characteristics of American Industrial Demilitarization Policy 363 |
| | 11.2 The End Results of Industrial Demilitarization 369 |
| | 11.3 The Mechanisms that Spoiled Industrial Demilitarization. 371 |
| | 11.4 “Dual-Use” Industry as a Component of the Cold War Origins Calculus 375 |
| | ABBREVIATIONS 381 |
| | ENDNOTES 382 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY 475 |
| | 1. Primary Document Collections 475 |
| | 2. Published Documents . 475 |
| | 3. Memoirs and Interviews. 479 |
| | 4. Monographs. 480 |
| | 5. Articles and Book Sections 497 |