| | Transnational crime and the interface between legal and illegal |
| | 1,81 | | MB | actors |
| | 242 | | stron |
| | 6267 | | ID | Leiden University, Centre of Environmental Science, The Netherlands |
| | 2006 | | rok |
| | Table of contents |
| | Chapter 1 Introduction |
| | 1.1 Research questions 3 |
| | 1.2 Definitions and data sources 5 |
| | 1.3 Plan of the book 6 |
| | 1.4 The rise of (the study of) transnational crime in the 1990s and beyond 7 |
| | 1.5 General assumptions about transnational crime 9 |
| | 1.5.1 Transnational crime as a new phenomenon 10 |
| | 1.5.2 Large (ethnically defined) criminal organizations as typical manifestation of transnational |
| | crime 11 |
| | 1.5.3 Collaboration between transnational criminal organizations as a way to divide the criminal |
| | underworld 12 |
| | 1.5.4 Globalization as the primary cause of transnational crime 12 |
| | 1.5.5 Transnational crime as cause of criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses and governments |
| | 13 |
| | Chapter 2 Interfaces between legal and illegal actors – from bricks to the Bahamas |
| | 2.1 Introduction 15 |
| | 2.2 Passas’ typology of interfaces 16 |
| | 2.2.1 A definition of transnational crime 16 |
| | 2.2.2 Legal and illegal actors 18 |
| | 2.2.3 Entreprise crime, political crime and hybrid crime 20 |
| | 2.2.4 Antithetical interfaces 21 |
| | Antagonistic relationships 22 |
| | Parasitical and predatory interfaces 23 |
| | Injurious interface 24 |
| | 2.2.5 Symbiotic interfaces 25 |
| | Outsourcing 25 |
| | Collaboration 26 |
| | Co-optation 26 |
| | Reciprocity 27 |
| | (Systemic) Synergy 29 |
| | Funding 30 |
| | Legal interactions 31 |
| | Legal actors committing organized crimes 31 |
| | 2.2.6 Conclusion section 2.2: the interface typology 13 |
| | 2.3 Three extentions of the interface typology: individuals, organizations and jurisdictions as |
| | interface 33 |
| | 2.3.1 Solo in transnational crime 34 |
| | 2.3.2 Legitimate organizations as interface 36 |
| | 2.3.3 Jurisdictions as interface 37 |
| | 2.4 Conclusions 39 |
| | Chapter 3 Individuals and legitimate organizations as interface |
| | 3.1 Individuals as interface 41 |
| | 3.1.1 Case studies of individuals as interface 44 |
| | Monzer Al Kassar 45 |
| | Victor Bout 48 |
| | Fouad Abbas 52 |
| | 3.1.2 Common characteristics 53 |
| | 3.1.3 Brokers in transnational crime 54 |
| | 3.1.4 Transnational (criminal) dealers 55 |
| | 3.1.5 Conclusion section 3.1: individuals as interface 56 |
| | 3.2 Legitimate organizations as interface 56 |
| | 3.2.1 Case studies of legitimate organizations as interface 57 |
| | International Overseas Services 57 |
| | Banco Ambrosiano 60 |
| | Nugan Hand Bank 62 |
| | Bank of Credit and Commerce International 64 |
| | The Dutch ‘Coffee Shop’ 66 |
| | Noraid 68 |
| | The CIA and other intelligence agencies 70 |
| | 3.2.2 Legitimate organizations as interface 73 |
| | 3.2.3 The coffee shop model 74 |
| | 3.2.4 The Abrosiano model 75 |
| | 3.2.5 Conclusion section 3.2: legal organizations as interface 76 |
| | Chapter 4 Jurisdictions and other geographically defined entities as interface |
| | 4.1 Introduction 79 |
| | 4.2 Jurisdictions and other geographically defined entities as interface I 79 |
| | 4.3 Tax havens, bank secrecy jurisdictions and offshore financial centres 81 |
| | 4.4 Jurisdictions and other geographically defined entities as interface II 84 |
| | 4.5 De facto interfaces I: the arms trade 86 |
| | 4.5.1 Arms supermarkets as de facto interfaces 87 |
| | 4.5.2 Dutch arms export policies as de facto interfaces 88 |
| | 4.6 De facto interfaces II: corrupt networks 90 |
| | 4.6.1 Club 45 in Vienna 91 |
| | 4.6.2 Propaganda Due (P2) in Italy and South America 95 |
| | 4.7 Conclusions 96 |
| | Chapter 5 Order in the chaos: the lock model |
| | 5.1. Introduction 99 |
| | 5.2 The lock model 99 |
| | 5.3 The lock function of individuals 101 |
| | 5.4 The lock function of legitimate organizations 103 |
| | 5.5 The lock function of jurisdictions 105 |
| | 5.6 Conclusions 108 |
| | Chapter 6 The transnational illicit art and antiquities trade: research outline and data sources |
| | 6.1 Introduction 111 |
| | 6.2 Data sources 112 |
| | 6.2.1 Official sources 112 |
| | The Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage in the Netherlands 113 |
| | The art squad of the national police in France 114 |
| | New Scotland Yard and the Ministry of Culture in the United Kingdom 115 |
| | The art and antiquities unit of the Carabinieri in Italy 115 |
| | 6.2.2 Interviews with experts 115 |
| | Archaeologists and museum curators 116 |
| | Art dealers 116 |
| | Other persons 117 |
| | 6.2.3 Media reports, non-academic literature and specialized media 117 |
| | IFAR Journal 117 |
| | Illicit Antiquities Research Centre 118 |
| | Media reports 118 |
| | The Museum Security Network reports 119 |
| | Non-academic literature 119 |
| | 6.3 Opportunities and limitations of the sources 119 |
| | Studies based on official sources 119 |
| | Studies based on the social environment of criminals 120 |
| | Studies based on media reports and studies by investigative Journalists 121 |
| | 6.4 Conclusions 122 |
| | Annex 1 Defining the illicit art and antiquities trade 123 |
| | Annex 2 Specialized police agencies dealing with art crimes 127 |
| | Chapter 7 The illicit art and antiquities trade: an introduction |
| | 7.1 Introduction 129 |
| | 7.2 The illicit trade 129 |
| | 7.2.1 Art theft 130 |
| | 7.2.2 Fakes and forgeries 131 |
| | 7.2.3 Looting and smuggling of antiquities 132 |
| | 7.2.4 War, civil war and occupation 135 |
| | 7.3 The extent of the illicit trade 137 |
| | 7.4 The link between the illicit art and antiquities trade and other illegal markets 139 |
| | 7.5 Conclusions 142 |
| | Chapter 8 Interfaces and the illicit art trade |
| | 8.1 Introduction 143 |
| | 8.2 The interface typology 144 |
| | 8.2.1 Antithetical interface 144 |
| | Injurious interface 144 |
| | Antagonistic and (systemic-) synergy interface 145 |
| | Predatory interface 149 |
| | Parasitical interface 150 |
| | 8.2.2 Symbiotic interfaces 152 |
| | Collaboration 152 |
| | Reciprocity 153 |
| | Outsourcing 154 |
| | Co-optation 155 |
| | Funding 156 |
| | 8.2.3 New and superfluous interface 156 |
| | 8.3 States conflict and crimes related to art 158 |
| | 8.4 The lock model and the interface typology: case studies from France, Italy and the Netherlands |
| | 161 |
| | 8.5 Conclusions 166 |
| | Chapter 9 Interfaces and the illicit antiquities trade |
| | 9.1 Introduction 167 |
| | 9.2 The interface typology 168 |
| | 9.2.1 Antithetical interfaces 169 |
| | Injurious interface 169 |
| | Antagonistic and (systemic-) synergy interface 173 |
| | Facilitating interface 177 |
| | Predatory and parasitical interface 178 |
| | 9.2.2 Symbiotic interfaces 179 |