| | Financial Assurance Issues of Environmental Liability |
| | 1,39 | | MB |
| | 256 | | stron |
| | 927 | | ID | Universiteit Maastricht |
| | 2001 | | rok |
| | Table of contents |
| | Reading Suggestion i |
| | Executive Summaryi |
| | § 1. Efficiency of the white paper liability regime.i |
| | A. Importance of some theoretical principles..i |
| | B. Mitigated strict liability rule ..i |
| | C. No retroactivityii |
| | D. Defenses .ii |
| | § 2. Insurability of the white paper liability regimeiii |
| | A. "Willingness to insure" is decisive ..iii |
| | B. Predictabilityiii |
| | C. Advice to insurers.iii |
| | D. Advice to the policy maker..iv |
| | § 3. Alternative financial arrangements .v |
| | § 4. Environmental damage without liabilityvii |
| | § 5. Influence of competition policy viii |
| | List of Abbreviations ix |
| | Chapter 1 Introduction1 |
| | § 1. Purpose of this study ..1 |
| | § 2. Focus on the white paper..1 |
| | § 3. Methodology ..2 |
| | A. Comparative law.2 |
| | B. Economic analysis .3 |
| | C. Integration: comparative law and economics approach .3 |
| | § 4. Policy orientation .4 |
| | § 5. Subsidiarity?4 |
| | § 6. Integration 6 |
| | § 7. Limits .6 |
| | § 8. Goal .7 |
| | § 9. Researchers involved and academic framework ..7 |
| | § 10. Structure 7 |
| | Chapter 2 Principles of liability: a theoretical framework.9 |
| | § 1. Introduction .9 |
| | § 2. Goals of accident law: the environmental case ..10 |
| | A. Prevention and Compensation..10 |
| | B. Optimal liability rules: basic ideas .11 |
| | 1. Optimal care levels 11 |
| | 2. Negligence. 12 |
| | 3. Strict liability 12 |
| | 4. Differences. 13 |
| | 5. Bilateral accidents . 13 |
| | § 3. Negligence or strict liability for environmental harm? ..14 |
| | A. The model14 |
| | B. Negligence ..15 |
| | 1. Optimal incentives. 15 |
| | 2. Learned Hand rule . 16 |
| | C. Strict liability.17 |
| | 1. Optimal incentives. 17 |
| | 2. Influence of the activity level .. 18 |
| | 3. A test for strict liability 18 |
| | D. Legal justifications for strict liability 19 |
| | 1. Improving the situation of the victim?. 19 |
| | 2. Redistribution? 20 |
| | E. Polluter Pays Principle .20 |
| | F. Strict liability for environmental harm? ..22 |
| | § 4. A few refinements .24 |
| | A. Information differences 24 |
| | B. Insolvency: strict liability versus negligence.24 |
| | C. Positive externalities..25 |
| | § 5. White paper on environmental liability..25 |
| | A. Balanced approach..25 |
| | B. Nuances 26 |
| | C. Remedy for insolvency? ..27 |
| | § 6. Environmental regulation..28 |
| | A. Criteria for safety regulation .28 |
| | 1. Information asymmetry as a criterion for regulatory intervention 29 |
| | 2. Insolvency risk. 29 |
| | 3. The threat of a liability suit 30 |
| | 4. Administrative costs . 30 |
| | B. The need to regulate environmental pollution..31 |
| | C. Safety regulation in practice ..32 |
| | D. Necessity to combine liability and regulation ..33 |
| | § 7. Retroactivity? ..34 |
| | A. Introduction 34 |
| | B. Statutes of limitation..34 |
| | C. Principles of efficient and fair compensation 35 |
| | D. Examples .36 |
| | E. Time lapse and incentives to prevent accidents37 |
| | F. Justice and compensation considerations 37 |
| | G.White paper: no retroactivity.38 |
| | Chapter 3 Possible defenses40 |
| | § 1. Introduction ..40 |
| | § 2. Force majeure..40 |
| | A. Economic justification..40 |
| | B. Examples: Belgian case law..41 |
| | C. Efficient case law.41 |
| | § 3. Justificative effect of following regulation ..42 |
| | A. Importance of licenses ..42 |
| | B. Position of Dutch legal doctrine and case law..43 |
| | C. Economic rationale.43 |
| | D. No "second guessing"45 |
| | E. Justificative effect in the white paper? .45 |
| | § 4. Development risk ..46 |
| | A. Liability to provide incentives for innovation? 46 |
| | B. Prospective overruling as a solution to the dilemma.47 |
| | C. Development risk defense: incentives to innovate .48 |
| | § 5. Contributory negligence.49 |
| | § 6. "First use"-defense 50 |
| | § 7. Small and medium sized enterprises 52 |
| | A. Small firms, small pollution? 52 |
| | B. Passing on of environmental costs .53 |
| | Chapter 4 Main principles in a few legal systems .55 |
| | § 1. Introduction ..55 |
| | § 2. Legal basis for liability in a few legal systems ..56 |
| | A. Belgium and Flanders56 |
| | 1. Civil law with modern features .. 56 |
| | 2. Liability for negligence .. 57 |
| | a. Fault . 57 |
| | b. Damage.. 58 |
| | c. Causation .. 60 |
| | 3. Strict liability 61 |
| | a. Civil code.. 61 |
| | b. Strict liability in treaties 61 |
| | 4. Proposals of the Interuniversity Commission.. 63 |
| | a. The Interuniversity Commission .. 63 |
| | b. Problems with the existing environmental liability system. 64 |
| | c. Parts 7 and 9 of the Draft Decree on environmental policy. 64 |
| | d. The proposed liability regime. 65 |
| | 5. Liability of soil clean-up in Flanders 65 |
| | a. Waste Decree of 2 July 1981 .. 65 |
| | b. Soil Clean-up Decree of 22 February 1995 . 66 |
| | c. Liability for new soil pollution .. 66 |
| | d. Liability for past pollution 67 |
| | 6. Summary. 67 |
| | B. United Kingdom ..69 |
| | 1. Negligence, nuisance and strict liability. 69 |
| | 2. Limits of Rylands v. Fletcher 70 |
| | 3. Cambridge Water Co. .. 70 |
| | C. The 1986 Swedish environmental damage act .71 |
| | D. The 1990 German environmental liability act..73 |
| | E. France 74 |
| | § 3. Retrospectivity?..76 |
| | A. Belgium and Flanders77 |
| | B. The Netherlands78 |
| | C. United Kingdom ..82 |
| | § 4. Defenses .82 |
| | A. Belgium and Flanders83 |
| | 1. Regulatory compliance defense? 83 |
| | 2. Interuniversity Commission . 83 |
| | 3. First use defense . 84 |
| | B. The Netherlands84 |
| | 1. Justificative effect of licences.. 84 |
| | 2. First use defense . 85 |
| | C. Sweden .85 |
| | D. Germany ..87 |
| | E. France 88 |